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A secure group communication architecture for autonomous
unmanned aerial vehiclesyy
Adrian N. Phillips, Barry E. Mullins*,y , Richard A. Raines and Rusty O. Baldwin
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB,
Ohio 45433, USA.

Summary
This paper investigates the application of a secure group communication architecture to a swarm of autonomous
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). A multicast secure group communication architecture for the low earth orbit
(LEO) satellite environment is evaluated to determine if it can be effectively adapted to a swarm of UAVs and
provide secure, scalable, and efﬁcient communications. The performance of the proposed security architecture is
evaluated with two other commonly used architectures using a discrete event computer simulation developed using
MATLAB. Performance is evaluated in terms of the scalability and efﬁciency of the group key distribution and
management scheme when the swarm size, swarm mobility, multicast group join and departure rates are varied.
The metrics include the total keys distributed over the simulation period, the average number of times an individual
UAV must rekey, the average bandwidth used to rekey the swarm, and the average percentage of battery consumed
by a UAV to rekey over the simulation period. The proposed security architecture can successfully be applied to a
swarm of autonomous UAVs using current technology. The proposed architecture is more efﬁcient and scalable
than the other tested and commonly used architectures. Over all the tested conﬁgurations, the proposed architecture
distributes 55.2–94.8% fewer keys, rekeys 59.0–94.9% less often per UAV, uses 55.2–87.9% less bandwidth to
rekey, and reduces the battery consumption by 16.9–85.4%. Published in 2008 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. Introduction
A swarm of autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) has great potential to provide beneﬁts in a
variety of applications, especially in the Department
of Defense (DoD) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission. UAV swarm applications
include continuous border patrol, battlespace surveillance, mapping routes for troop movement, real-time

information distribution to mobile military units, and
extending communications via an airborne network.
Grouping UAVs into a swarm allows them to carry a
range of sensors with an array of capabilities, creating
a diverse group that provides a wide viewing range
and increased reliability through redundancy [1].
A swarm of UAVs is an example of a mobile ad hoc
network (MANET). A MANET is a system of mobile
hosts connected by wireless links, the union of which
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forms a communication network modeled in the form
of an arbitrary communication graph [2]. The lack of
ﬁxed infrastructure and the mobility of nodes in a
MANET cause frequent changes in the network topology. This unpredictable environment presents numerous challenges especially in providing efﬁcient
communication. In addition, most nodes in a MANET
rely on batteries, which limit available power and
further compounds the challenge and increases the
need for an efﬁcient communication method.
One effective way to achieve efﬁcient communication in a MANET is through multicast communication.
Multicasting is a set of technologies that allows a
source node to send data to multiple destination nodes
simultaneously while transmitting only a single copy of
the data on to the network [3]. The data are replicated
for the destination nodes only when necessary. In a
cooperative environment, such as a UAV swarm, nodes
often need to transmit data to the entire group. Communication via multicasting, as opposed to unicasting,
signiﬁcantly reduces the processing load on the source
and the overall bandwidth used in the network. Moreover, in a wireless environment, due to the broadcast
nature of the wireless medium, multicasting has the
potential to further reduce network trafﬁc, and hence
reduce network energy expenditure [4].
In addition to making communication efﬁcient,
ensuring the security of the communication is another
increasingly important feature in a UAV swarm; this is
especially true in the military. Previous UAV swarm
research improved communication efﬁciency and effectiveness, with little emphasis on security [5–7].
However, the sensitivity of UAV swarm applications
necessitates a secure communication architecture that
provides DoD-mandated information assurance. With
this added security component, a swarm of autonomous UAVs can provide a unique and powerful netcentric asset to support the warﬁghter.
2.
2.1.

Security in a Multicast Environment
Security Services

There are basic security services that should be built in
all security architectures regardless if the environment
is wired, wireless, unicast, multicast, infrastructure, or
ad hoc. These include conﬁdentiality, availability, integrity, non-repudiation, and authentication. In addition
to these, there are security services that are unique to a
multicast environment including group key secrecy,
forward secrecy, and group access control (GAC).
Group key secrecy guarantees that it is computationally
Published in 2008 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

infeasible for an adversary to discover any group key
[8]. Forward secrecy ensures new members are not able
to read past trafﬁc, and backward secrecy ensures
former members are not able to read present and future
trafﬁc [9]. GAC is the ability to permit or deny
membership into multicast groups [10].
2.2.

Group Key Management

For secure wireless multicasting, cryptography and key
management schemes are needed, in which cryptographic keys are used to encrypt and decrypt messages.
The group key management scheme accomplishes the
management and distribution of these keys. This includes enforcing the security services described above,
which ensure only legitimate members of the multicast
group hold valid keys and can access group data at any
time during a multicast session.
In a UAV swarm, most if not all of the UAVs will be
powered by batteries, making computationally intense
exponentiations, such as public key cryptography,
infeasible. An alternative solution is to implement
symmetric key cryptography to secure communications. Symmetric key cryptography requires all group
members to use the same shared key. This shared
decryption key is often called the Session Encryption
Key (SEK) or Trafﬁc Encryption Key (TEK). To
preserve the secrecy (both forward and backward) of
the multicast data, the SEK needs to be updated upon
certain events such as a member joining and leaving
the group.
Group key management is one of the most
resource-intensive operations on the network, and
the dynamic nature of MANETs increases the complexity and overhead of managing this process. This is
even more of a challenge when the number of members in the multicast group is large. Increasing the
number of members not only increases the amount of
keys that need to be distributed, but it also increases
the frequency of rekeying because there will undoubtedly be more activity. This security overhead can
overwhelm the network if a proper security architecture is not in place. Thus, the scalability of the
selected security architecture is crucial when the
size of the group grows.
3. Secure and Scalable Group
Communication Architectures
The Hubenko architecture is a secure group communication architecture that combines the key features of
the well-known multicast architectures in a way that
Security Comm. Networks. 2009; 1:55–69
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Fig. 1. Hubenko architecture.

increases system scalability for secure multicast in a
low earth orbit (LEO) satellite environment [11].
Figure 1 shows a conceptual model of the Hubenko
architecture in a LEO satellite environment. The LEO
satellites are represented by satellite ﬁgures, group
keys are represented by letters, and users are represented by numbers. In this architecture, LEO satellites
form a cluster at the top of the hierarchy with a
group key ‘‘V’’. Group Cluster Keys A through H are
assigned to a cluster of users. A different group key
for each cluster. The satellite application in [11] is
essentially a two-tier architecture. Since the group
cluster keys are maintained anboard the satellite. The
Hubenko architecture is modular in its design. As a
result, the underlying multicast routing and rekeying
protocol are transparent and can be selected to best ﬁt
each unique application.
One of the key features incorporated into the
Hubenko architecture is clustering. Clustering divides
a single large multicast group into subgroups to
reduce the overhead involved when group members
join or leave the group. The best features of two
clustering architectures, known as Spatial Clustering
[12] and Iolus [13] are combined to form the basic
framework of the Hubenko architecture. Multicast
groups are divided into subgroups (clusters) based
on the physical location of its members. By using
spatial boundaries the key distribution scheme can
exploit the parallelism inherent in different parts of a
multicast tree to greatly enhance performance [12].
Using the Iolus framework, all of the clusters are
independent and each cluster has its own group leader
and secret group key. As a result, if a new member
joins or leaves the multicast group, only the affected
Published in 2008 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

cluster needs to rekey as opposed to the entire multicast group. Each cluster is managed by a group
security agent (GSA), known as a cluster leader. The
cluster leaders work with other cluster leaders to
bridge the local multicast trafﬁc from each cluster
into all of the other clusters as needed [13]. At the
head of the hierarchy is a group security controller
that manages all of the cluster leaders and the overall
security of the group. This is the job of the satellites in
the Hubenko architecture. The number and size of the
clusters as well as the number of levels in the
hierarchy is ﬂexible depending on the application.
To further increase system scalability, the Hubenko
architecture incorporates many of the crucial features of
another security architecture known as Gothic [10].
Gothic is a comprehensive architecture that provides
GAC. The architecture contains a group policy management system and a group member authorization system.
The group policy management system has a group
owner who provides a list of authorized members and
other appropriate security policies for the group to the
access control server (ACS). The group member authorization system provides the core control of the architecture by controlling access to the group [10]. These
features strengthen system security by preventing unauthorized users from attempting malicious acts such as
trafﬁc analysis or denial of service attacks. The designers of Gothic created the architecture with low
computation overhead at the routers, low message
overhead, and low support infrastructure requirements
[10]. These attributes are ideal for resource-constrained
MANETs and, in particular, UAV swarms.
Another important feature of Gothic used in the
Hubenko architecture is the group access control aware
Security Comm. Networks. 2009; 1:55–69
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group key management (GACA-GKM) [10]. This
feature leverages the trust built into the GAC system
to reduce the requirements of group key management
and obtain substantial overhead reductions in a way
that enhances scalability and improves performance in
terms of less rekeying overhead [11]. For example, in a
typical group key management system, whenever a
user joins or leaves a multicast group, the entire system
is rekeyed based on the assumption that the new user
could have gained access to either the old encrypted
data prior to arrival or to new encrypted data after
departure. By leveraging the services of the GAC
system to ensure no unwanted users have access to
the data prior to their validated join or after their
departure, a rekey is not required [11].

4.

Approach

Although the Hubenko architecture has been designed
for a LEO satellite system, this research investigates
the feasibility of using the architecture to provide a
secure, scalable multicast architecture for UAV
swarms in the global information grid (GIG). The
Hubenko architecture applied to a UAV swarm is
shown in Figure 2. A large UAV such as a Global
Hawk has a similar role as the LEO satellite in the
original Hubenko architecture; however, this research
studies the impact of using the Hubenko architecture
in a three-tier hierarchal network with the three layers
being a Global Hawk, cluster leaders, and users
(UAVs). The Global Hawk is the group security
controller, group ACS, and is responsible for the
overall security of the entire swarm. ‘‘GK’’ is the
multicast group key shared among the cluster leaders
and the Global Hawk. Each cluster has its own cluster
key represented by ‘‘CKn’’. The black lines represent
communication links while the circles with thick lines
represent cluster boundaries. The dashed lines repre-

Fig. 2. Hubenko architecture applied to UAV swarm.
Published in 2008 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

sent the GACA-GKM on the Global Hawk, which
communicates with the cluster leaders to manage
access to the group. Instead of satellite spot beams
dictating the number and size of the clusters, this is
constrained by the capabilities of the UAVs selected as
cluster leaders. When a multicast group ﬁrst forms,
the Global Hawk assigns UAVs as either cluster
leaders or cluster members based on their capabilities
and location. Ideally medium-sized UAVs are assigned as cluster leaders since they have greater range,
endurance, and processing capabilities. The cluster
leaders communicate with the Global Hawk ﬂying at
an altitude of about 15 km and all of the UAVs in their
respective clusters. To increase available bandwidth
and avoid transmission collisions the cluster leaders
loiter above their clusters and use directional antennas
aimed at their cluster. The cluster leaders communicate amongst each other to keep their clusters from
overlapping.
The other architectures evaluated in this study are
the baseline and the cluster. The baseline architecture
for a swarm of UAVs is a ﬂat model, consisting of
the swarm and the multicast group leader, which is the
Global Hawk. It includes the basic security functions of
key generation, key storage, key agreement, and group
key distribution to provide a dynamic application
proof-of-concept [11]. The entire swarm shares a single
SEK and thus every swarm member is rekeyed on a
member join or departure. The cluster architecture is an
enhanced baseline architecture that includes the clustering concepts from Spatial Clustering and Iolus. Each
cluster is independent and has its own unique SEK. As
a result, each cluster only needs to be rekeyed when
there is a join to, or departure from its cluster.

5.

System Description

The System Under Test (SUT) is the UAV Swarm
Group Communication System. It consists of the
security architecture, wireless network, UAVs, and
the multicast routing protocol. The component under
test (CUT) is the security architecture. Speciﬁcally,
the Hubenko architecture is compared to a baseline
ﬂat architecture and a basic clustered architecture.
The workload of the SUT is ultimately the amount
of multicast trafﬁc that needs to be distributed. This
study speciﬁcally focuses on reducing the trafﬁc and
overhead associated with group key management and
distribution. Thus, the amount of multicast trafﬁc
related to group key management depends upon
several parameters including the size of the swarm
Security Comm. Networks. 2009; 1:55–69
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(multicast group), the number and rate of joins
and departures to the multicast group, the swarm’s
mobility, the number of clusters, and the length of the
group key. The workload to the SUT is generated by
varying these parameters. For example, increasing the
swarm size, the group join rate, the group departure
rate, the swarm’s mobility, and the length of the key
will all increase the amount of rekey operations
necessary to secure the swarm. As a result the overall
amount of multicast trafﬁc increases, thus increasing
the workload to the SUT. On the other hand, decreasing the swarm size, the group join rate, the group
departure rate, the swarm’s mobility, and the length of
the key will decrease the amount of rekey operations
necessary, thus reducing multicast trafﬁc and the
workload to the SUT. The system parameters consist
of the transmission range, bandwidth, the physical
layer and MAC standard, battery power, processing
capabilities, cluster diameter, and UAV speed.

6. Experimental Design
The work by Hubenko in [11] provides insight into the
impact of the multicast group size and mobility on
each of the investigated architectures. However, the
activity and characteristics of the multicast groups
modeled in that work do not reﬂect a realistic scenario
for a swarm of UAVs. Hubenko’s study models a
multicast group whose members join within a ﬁxed
time, with some of the members leaving after random
intervals. This is visually represented by Scenario 1 in
Figure 3. There may be some applications when this
model will properly characterize a UAV swarm, but
the multicast activity represented by Scenario 2 in
Figure 3 is a better model of a UAV swarm’s activity.
Scenario 2 represents a multicast group with continuous departures, and rejoins to the group. Most of the
envisioned missions of UAV swarms (continuous
border patrol, battlespace surveillance, ISR etc.) require the swarm sustains itself for prolonged periods
of time. This could be several hours or even several
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days. Currently small UAVs (SUAVs), which comprise the bulk of the swarm, have limited battery life
typically ranging from 1 to 3 h [14]. Therefore, in
order for the swarm to sustain its strength and size, its
members will need to depart and rejoin several times
throughout the duration of the mission to replace or
recharge batteries.
Thus, this study tests the Hubenko architecture
using Scenario 2 in addition to Scenario 1, to represent
different mission requirements placed on UAV
swarms. The scenarios are distinguished by the multicast group activity over the simulation period. Scenario 1 represents the scenario where UAVs join the
swarm and must depart after their batteries are depleted. None of the departing UAVs rejoin the group.
In Scenario 2, the UAV swarm joins the multicast
group, but there are continuous departures and rejoins
over a longer period. The burden of continuous
departures and rejoins to the multicast group will
fully test the architectures for a UAV swarm.
6.1.

Performance Metrics

As group key management is one of the most complex
and resource-intensive operations on the network, the
performance metrics should measure how efﬁcient
and scalable the security architecture is in terms of
group key management. Thus, the following performance metrics are deﬁned:
 Total Keys: The total number of keys distributed
during the simulation period.
 Average Rekeys: Average number of times a UAV
must rekey during the simulation period.
Similar metrics were used to evaluate the performance
of the Hubenko architecture in the LEO satellite
environment as well as related work in the area of
secure group communications [11]. These metrics are
also relevant in determining potential security performance improvements [15,16].
In addition to the metrics listed above, Scenario 2
also measures:
 Average Bandwidth: The average amount of bandwidth used to rekey for a group rekey operation.
 Battery Consumed: The average percentage of
battery consumed by a UAV to rekey during the
simulation period.

Fig. 3. Multicast group activity for the tested scenarios.
Published in 2008 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

These metrics are very important in an environment
such as an autonomous UAV swarm where battery
Security Comm. Networks. 2009; 1:55–69
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capacity and bandwidth are often limited and costly.
These metrics also further highlight the cost associated with rekeying.
In order to calculate average bandwidth and battery
consumed, a few assumptions are made to simplify the
experiments. An encryption key length of 256 bits is
chosen, as it is a standard key length in the popular
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Thus, the size
of the network layer packet used to distribute the SEK
on a rekey is 688 bits as shown below:
Packet Size ¼ MAC Header þ CRC
þ Encryption Key þ IP Header
¼ 240 bits þ 32 bits þ 256 bits þ 160 bits
¼ 688 bits
The average bandwidth is calculated by summing all
the rekeys for each UAV performed over the simulation period multiplied by the packet size and divided
by the number of seconds in the simulation. This
yields the average bits per second (bps). This calculation assumes that each UAV is rekeyed directly by its
cluster leader or by the Global Hawk in the case of the
baseline architecture. Also, this calculation only takes
the packet with the SEK into account. Management or
acknowledgement packets are not used in the calculation because they depend on the speciﬁc higher level
protocols used. This calculation also assumes a pairwise rekey between the cluster leader (Global Hawk)
and each UAV, which results in one separate message
for each UAV (n messages).
The same assumptions used to calculate average
bandwidth are also applied to calculate battery consumed. In addition, assumptions about the battery and
radio are necessary. The representative battery chosen
for the simulations is the Thunder Power Lithium Poly
battery, which has a usable voltage range from 14.0 to
16.7 V and a 4,200 mA-hr capacity [17]. This battery
is currently being used to power UAVs for swarming
applications [17]. The representative radio chosen for
the simulations is the Ubiquiti Networks SuperRange9 radio, which is also currently being used in
conjunction with the selected battery in UAV research
[17]. The SuperRange9 is a 900 MHz wireless radio,
which features up to 700 mW of output power,
88 dBm receive sensitivity performance (for the
11 Mbps data rate), and has proven non-line-of sight
distances over 20 km [18]. Transmit and receive are
1200 mA and 500 mA respectively [18]. The range
and capabilities of the selected radio and battery make
Published in 2008 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Table I. Energy consumption symbols.
ERx
ETx
bT
bR
dT
dR
r

Energy consumed from receiving (mA-hr)
Energy consumed from transmitting (mA-hr)
Bits transmitted
Bits received
Current draw from transmitting (mA-hr)
Current draw from receiving (mA-hr)
Data rate (bits/second)

the assumed communication ranges for the three
architectures viable.
With the battery and radio selected, there is enough
information to calculate battery consumed. First, the
energy consumed to rekey is found, which consists of
the energy consumed to transmit the rekey packet and
the energy consumed to receive the rekey packet. The
equations used to calculate the energy consumed to
receive and transmit are shown in (1) and (2) respectively [19]. The symbols used in the equations are
deﬁned in Table I. The bits transmitted and received
are the number of bits in the rekey packet (688). The
current draw from transmitting and receiving are
taken from the radio’s datasheet, and the data rate is
assumed to be 11 Mbps.
bR  dR

3600 hrs r
ð1Þ
688  500 mA

¼
0:0000087
mAhr
¼
3600 hrs 11 Mbps

ERx ¼

bT  dT

3600 hrs r
ð2Þ
688  1200 mA

¼
¼
0:0000208
mAhr
3600 hrs 11 Mbps

ETx ¼

The results of Equations (1) and (2) are divided by the
battery capacity to get a percentage of battery consumed to receive a rekey packet and transmit a rekey
packet.
Battery Consumed Rx ¼

0:0000087 mAhr
4200 mA
 100 ¼ 0:000000207%

Battery Consumed Tx ¼

0:0000208 mAhr
4200 mA
 100 ¼ 0:000000495%
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Table II. Factor levels for scenario 1.
Factor

Level 1

Swarm size
Swarm mobility
Join rate
Departure rate
Architecture

40
25%
15%
25%
Baseline

Level 2
100
75%
30%
75%
Cluster

Level 3

Level 4

200

500

Hubenko

These equations are used in the simulation to calculate
an overall average percentage of battery consumed by
a UAV to rekey during the simulation period.
6.2.

Experimental Factors and Parameters

Tables II and III summarize the factors selected from
the system and workload parameters for Scenarios 1
and 2 respectively. These factors are varied to determine the impact they have on the security performance of the UAV swarm in terms of the metrics
described above.
The following further describes the factors and
deﬁnes the levels chosen:
 Swarm Size: The number of UAVs in the swarm
impacts the total number of keys to be distributed
and also increases the overall activity of the swarm,
thereby increasing the number of times a UAV
needs to rekey. Based on proposed UAV swarms
and possible applications the levels selected for
Scenario 1 are 40, 100, 200, and 500 UAVs.
Scenario 2 also includes 1,000 UAVs to further
increase the workload.
 Swarm Mobility: This is the percentage of the
swarm that is highly mobile. In this study, UAVs
are deﬁned as highly mobile if they travel outside of
a 5 km radius, whereas UAVs that stay within a
5 km radius are deﬁned as loiterers. A highly
mobile environment requires much more rekeying
overhead than one in which UAVs loiter in the same
general area for long periods of time. The levels
Table III. Factor levels for Scenario 2.
Factor

Level 1

Swarm size
40
Swarm
mobility
25%
Architecture Baseline

Level 2

Level 3

100

200

500

50%
Cluster

75%
Hubenko

90%

Published in 2008 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Level 4 Level 5
1,000
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selected for Scenario 1 are 25 and 75%. In addition
to these levels, Scenario 2 includes 50 and 90%
swarm mobility levels.
 Group Join Rate: This is the percentage of the
simulation time it takes for the entire swarm to
initially joined the multicast group. The rate at
which UAVs join the multicast group has an impact
on the overhead necessary to maintain overall
security of the swarm. The levels chosen are 15
and 30%. Thus, when the rate is set to 15%, there
will be several more joins to the multicast group in
a shorter amount of time compared to when the rate
is sent to 30%. The group join rate for Scenario 2 is
ﬁxed.
 Group Departure Rate: This is the percentage of
the swarm that departs the multicast group prior to
the end of the simulation. The number of departures
from the multicast group impacts the overhead
necessary to maintain overall security of the swarm.
The levels chosen for Scenario1 are 25 and 75%.
The UAVs that depart the group do so after a
normally distributed amount of time. The group
departure rate for Scenario 2 is not a factor because
it is set to 100% for all of the simulations.
 Security Architecture: This is the CUT. The security architecture impacts the total number of rekeying operations and the overall security performance
of the system. The levels selected are the baseline
(ﬂat architecture), cluster, and Hubenko.
The parameters of the system are the properties,
which when changed can impact the performance of
the system. The ﬁxed experimental parameters are
displayed in Table IV and further described here:
 PHY/MAC Standard: The physical layer and media
access control standards deﬁne channel access and
data encoding, modulation, and transmission. IEEE

Table IV. Fixed parameter values.
Parameter

Scenario 1 value

Scenario 2 value

PHY/MAC standard
Bandwidth
Processor speed
UAV speed
Battery capacity
Group key length
Number of clusters
Cluster diameter
Simulation length

IEEE 802.11b
11 Mbps
1.8 GHz
25 m/s
4,200 mA-hr
256 bits
10
10 km
7,200 time
steps (2 h)

IEEE 802.11b
11 Mbps
1.8 GHz
25 m/s
4,200 mA-hr
256 bits
10
10 km
43,200 time
steps (12 h)
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802.11b is a widely known technology and the
current standard of choice for similar research [20].
Bandwidth: The channel bandwidth restricts how
much data can be transmitted to the swarm per
second. IEEE 802.11b has a maximum bandwidth
of 11 Mbps.
Processing Capabilities: This affects the ability of
the UAVs to generate keys and perform encryption
and decryption operations. UAVs used in similar
research are currently equipped with a Kontron
1.8 GHz processor with 1 GB memory [17].
UAV Speed: UAV speed impacts how fast and to what
degree the network topology changes. A reasonable
speed given the expected size and maneuverability of
a typical UAV in HARVEST is 25 m/s [21].
Battery Capacity: This affects the ability of the
UAVs to transmit and receive rekey packets. UAVs
used in similar research are currently equipped with
a Thunder Power Lithium Poly battery (TP42004S2PB) with a 4,200 mA-hr capacity [17].
Group Key Length: This affects the security of the
system and the size of the rekey packets. Larger
keys increase the security of the system, but require
more bandwidth, processing power, and storage.
This study assumes a key length of 256 bits, which
is a standard length for AES encryption.
Number of Clusters: This impacts the scalability,
efﬁciency, and communication overhead required
in the cluster and Hubenko architectures. The ideal
number of clusters varies depending on the situation and may be constrained by resources. Since
cluster analysis is beyond the scope of this research,
the number of clusters for this study is set at 10 to
allow for comparison to previous work [11].
Cluster Diameter: This is a function of the antenna,
transmission range, and altitude of the UAV chosen as
the cluster leader and affects the swarm’s coverage
area. Based on the current capabilities of mediumsized UAVs the cluster diameter is chosen to be 10 km.
Simulation Length: Longer simulations have more
activity such as joins and departures and more
mobility among the clusters. The simulation length
for Scenario 1 is 2 h which is near the end of the
endurance of smaller UAVs [14]. The simulation
length for Scenario 2 is 12 h. This represents UAVs
having the ability to swap out batteries and rejoin
the swarm after a certain amount of time.

6.3.

Experimental Setup

The experimental setup for this study consists of two
sub-experiments, each with a full-factorial design
Published in 2008 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

with the factors listed in Tables I and II. The ﬁrst
sub-experiment simulates Scenario 1 and closely
resembles the experiments in [11], allowing for comparisons. It consists of 8 repetitions for each conﬁguration, requiring a total of 768 simulation runs (4 
2  2  2  3  8 ¼ 768). The second sub-experiment
simulates Scenario 2, which is a new test of the
Hubenko architecture. It consists of 20 repetitions for
each conﬁguration, requiring a total of 1,200 runs
(5  4  3  20 ¼ 1,200). Thus, the overall experiment
will consist of 1,968 simulation runs. The number of
repetitions provides a narrow enough conﬁdence interval while minimizing the number of experiments necessary. Each of the repetitions for the same
conﬁguration use a different seed for the random
number generator which affects the various aspects of
the simulation including the join time, departure time,
assigned cluster, and mobility of the each UAV.

7.

Simulation Environment

Currently a swarm of autonomous unmanned vehicles
is still in the concept stage and an actual system is not
yet ﬁelded. Thus, measurement of an actual system is
not feasible for this study. In addition, using an actual
system, if one existed, would be very costly and time
consuming. Using an analytical model is also not a
viable option because there is no such model that can
be adapted to this scenario. Thus, the best evaluation
technique for this study is a simulation. Because this
study is speciﬁcally concerned with reducing security
overhead in the form of group key management, much
of the details about data transmission, packets, and
routing can be abstracted away. This makes MATLAB
the best choice to perform the simulation for this
study.
A discrete event computer simulation using MATLAB, (version R2007a) is developed to evaluate the
performance of the baseline, cluster, and Hubenko
architectures in terms of group key management and
distribution in a swarm of UAVs. The simulation
environment is a modiﬁed version of the one used in
[11], which models a satellite-based multicast network. However, several modiﬁcations to the simulation are made to characterize a swarm of UAVs and
this study’s experimental design. Although a detailed
description of the original simulation environment can
be found in [11], several signiﬁcant modiﬁcations are
described below.
In the original simulation the time steps are left
undeﬁned, however for the purpose of this research
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one time step represents one second. This means if a
UAV joins the multicast group at the beginning of the
one second interval, it will not receive a multicast key
until the end of the interval, thus having to wait up to
one second to start receiving multicast data. The same
logic applies to a UAV leaving the multicast group. If
a UAV leaves the multicast group at the beginning of
the one second interval, it still may be able to receive
multicast data for up to one second because the rest of
the UAVs in the multicast group will be rekeyed at the
end of the one second interval. In actual use applications larger or smaller intervals can be used depending
on the security needs of the system.
Another important modiﬁcation is how the metrics
total keys and average rekeys are calculated for the
baseline study. Because the original study deals with a
geographically-widespread satellite environment, the
baseline architecture requires a rekey operation anytime a user moved from one spot beam to another
regardless if the is was already a member of the
multicast group. However, in this study the baseline
architecture is a large UAV acting as the single multicast group leader with a swarm of smaller UAVs
locally distributed out within its range. Because it is
assumed that the multicast group leader can directly
and/or indirectly transmit to all members of the
swarm, there is no need to rekey as swarm members
move within that range. For example, the highly
mobile UAV in Figure 2 would not cause a rekey in
the baseline study because clusters are non-existent
and Global Hawk acts as the multicast group leader
for the entire swarm.
The simulation environment is also modiﬁed to
simulate both scenarios. The original study only
simulates the multicast group activity of Scenario 1
shown in Figure 3. Aside from the changes mentioned
above both scenarios require changes to the experimental parameters and factors to correspond to the
experimental design and properly model a UAV
swarm.
7.1.

Scenario 1 Simulation

In Scenario 1,2 h or 7,200 discrete time steps of
rekeying activity in a UAV swarm is simulated.
During each simulation run, all factors (join rate,
departure rate, mobility rate, and swarm size) are
held constant, but the three architectures are tested
under the same conditions. Each UAV is randomly
assigned an initial join time to the multicast group, an
initial cluster, a mobility type (highly mobile or
loitering), and a departure time (if applicable). All
Published in 2008 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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of the random assignments are based on a uniform
distribution. The join rate determines whether the
UAVs randomly join within the ﬁrst 15 or 30% of
the simulation time. The departure rate determines the
percentage of the swarm that departs the group before
the end of the simulation (either 25 or 75%). The
mobility rate determines the percentage of the swarm
assigned as highly mobile or loiterers. The UAVs
assigned as highly mobile change clusters throughout
the simulation based on their velocity of 25 m/s, while
the UAVs assigned as loiterers remain in their initial
assigned cluster. The total keys and average rekeys are
tracked for each individual UAV for each of the three
tested architectures.

7.2.

Scenario 2 Simulation

In Scenario 2,12 h or 43,200 discrete time steps of
rekeying activity in a UAV swarm is simulated. This
scenario allows UAVs to rejoin the multicast group
after departing and models the situation where a UAV
swarm needs to be sustained for a long period of time,
longer than a UAV’s typical battery life. Thus UAVs
depart the swarm to recharge or exchange their
batteries and then rejoin the group. The join rate is
not a factor and is held constant. The departure rate is
also not a factor in this scenario because the swarm
members continuously depart and rejoin the multicast
group. Similar to Scenario 1, the mobility rate and
swarm size are held constant during each run and the
three architectures are tested simultaneously under the
same conditions.
In the beginning of the simulation, each UAV is
randomly assigned an initial join time during the ﬁrst
simulated hour (3,600 time steps). Each UAV is also
randomly assigned a duration (battery life) ranging
from 30 to 180 min. This represents the battery
capacities of the various small UAVs currently in
operation as can be found in the DoD’s Unmanned
Systems Roadmap [14]. Also, varying battery capacities would be typical in a heterogeneous UAV
swarm. Each UAV is randomly assigned to an initial
cluster and as highly mobile or loitering. After a UAV
initially joins the multicast group, it stays for its
randomly-assigned duration and then departs. It then
rejoins the swarm 30 min later representing the time to
swap out its battery. This is repeated throughout the
simulation. The total keys, average rekeys, average
bandwidth, and battery consumed are tracked for
each individual UAV for each of the three tested
architectures.
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Fig. 4. Total keys versus swarm size (Scenario 1); (a) 25% mobile, 25% departure rate (b) 25% mobile, 75% departure rate
(c) 75% mobile, 25% departure rate (d) 75% mobile, 75% departure rate.

8.

8.1.

Experimental Results

Scenario 1

The results from Scenario 1 are displayed in Figures 4
and 5. Both ﬁgures contain four plots labeled a–d,
representing the different conﬁgurations of the factors
swarm mobility and departure rate. The factor join
rate is not included because it does not signiﬁcantly
impact the variation in either response. The 95%
conﬁdence intervals are not shown on the plots because they are too narrow to be distinguished.
Figure 4 displays total keys versus swarm size. As
expected, more keys are distributed in the system
when the swarm size is the largest and mobility is
high. Also, as predicted, the fewest keys are distributed in the system with the Hubenko architecture. The
baseline and cluster architectures’ performance relative to each other vary depending on the swarm’s
mobility and departure rate. By visual inspection it
can be seen that the Hubenko architecture has statistically signiﬁcant differences compared to the baseline and cluster architectures. Also, statistically
signiﬁcant differences can be seen among the various
swarm sizes.
Using pair-wise comparisons of the mean responses
at the 0.05 level of signiﬁcance, each level of the
swarm size as well as both levels of mobility have
signiﬁcant statistical differences from all other levels.
The Hubenko architecture is statistically different
Published in 2008 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

from the cluster and baseline architectures, but the
baseline and cluster architectures are not statistically
different from each other. The two levels of both the
departure rate and the join rate are not statistically
different. Using the mean response values across all
factors, the total keys distributed in the system is
86.2% less in the Hubenko architecture compared to
baseline and 89.2% less compared to the cluster
architecture.
Average rekeys versus swarm size is shown in
Figure 5. Comparing Figures 4 and 5, it can be seen
that the factors have similar effects on average rekeys
as they did on the total keys. Also, by visual inspection
it can be seen that the Hubenko architecture has
signiﬁcant statistical differences compared to the
baseline and cluster architectures and has the lowest
average rekeys across all factor combinations. Using
95% conﬁdence intervals, signiﬁcant statistical differences exist among the various swarm sizes and the
two mobility levels. Using the mean response values
across all factor levels, the average rekeys per UAV is
84.9% less in the Hubenko architecture compared to
the baseline and 87.1% compared to the cluster
architecture.
Several important conclusions can be drawn from
Scenario 1. First and foremost, the growth rate of both
responses versus the swarm size and mobility is signiﬁcantly smaller using the Hubenko architecture. This
demonstrates the architecture is both scalable and
efﬁcient as predicted. Also, we learn that the swarm
size and architecture cause the biggest variation in
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Fig. 5. Average rekeys versus swarm size (Scenario 1); (a) 25% mobile, 25% departure rate (b) 25% mobile, 75% departure rate
(c) 75% mobile, 25% departure rate (d) 75% mobile, 75% departure rate.

both responses followed by the swarm’s mobility.
Although the join rate has a small p-value using
analysis of variance (ANOVA), it causes less than 1%
of the variation in both responses. Therefore, join rate is
dropped as a factor in Scenario 2.
8.2.

Scenario 2

The results from Scenario 2 are displayed in
Figures 6–9. Each ﬁgure contains four plots labeled

a–d, which correspond to different mobility levels: 25,
50, 75, and 90%. The 95% conﬁdence intervals are not
shown on the plots because they are too narrow to be
distinguished.
Total keys versus swarm size is shown in Figure 6.
By visual inspection it can be seen that a larger the
swarm size and higher mobility increases the total
keys distributed, while using the Hubenko Architecture decreases the total keys distributed. Unlike Scenario 1, the cluster architecture outperforms the

Fig. 6. Total keys versus swarm size (Scenario 2); (a) 25% mobile (b) 50% mobile (c) 75% mobile (d) 90% mobile.
Published in 2008 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Fig. 7. Average rekeys versus swarm size (Scenario 2); (a) 25% mobile (b) 50% mobile (c) 75% mobile (d) 90% mobile.

baseline architecture in every situation which reveals
the negative impact departures and rejoins have on the
baseline architecture. Using pair-wise comparisons of
the mean responses at the 0.05 level of signiﬁcance,
each level of the swarm size has signiﬁcant statistical
differences from all other levels. Each architecture is
also signiﬁcantly different from all other architectures. Using the mean response values across all
factors, 87.6% less keys are distributed in the Hubenko architecture compared to the baseline and
85.0% less keys are distributed compared to the
cluster architecture.
Figure 7 displays the average rekeys versus the
swarm size. Statistically signiﬁcant differences can be
seen among the three architectures and the various
swarm sizes. Using pair-wise comparisons of the
mean responses at the 0.05 level of signiﬁcance,
each level of the swarm size has signiﬁcant statistical
differences from all other levels. Each architecture is
also statistically different from all other architectures.
The 25% mobility level and the 90% mobility level
are the only mobility levels with signiﬁcant statistical
differences. A UAV in the Hubenko architecture
rekeys an average of 87.3% less than a UAV in the
baseline architecture. Similarly, a UAV in the Hubenko architecture rekeys an average of 79.9% less
than a UAV in the cluster architecture.
Figure 8 displays average bandwidth versus the
swarm size. In terms of reducing the use of limited
resources, such as bandwidth, the power of the
Hubenko architecture is evident. At the 25% mobility
Published in 2008 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

level, both the cluster and Hubenko architecture scale
well, relative to the baseline, as the swarm size increases. However, once mobility increases, the bandwidth used by the cluster architecture nears that of the
baseline, while the Hubenko architecture is minimally
affected. At the 90% mobility level, the Hubenko
architecture uses an average of 85.3% less bandwidth
than the cluster architecture and 87.3% less than the
baseline architecture.
Figure 9 displays battery consumed versus the
swarm size. Interestingly, the baseline architecture
outperforms the cluster architecture in terms of the
response. In the baseline architecture, the Global
Hawk uses fuel, not batteries and rekeys all of the
swarm members. Thus, battery is only consumed
when a swarm member receives a new key. However,
in the cluster and Hubenko architectures, the keys are
distributed by cluster leaders, which are swarm members themselves, and thus energy is consumed to both
transmit and receive a key. Although the results
appear insigniﬁcant as the percentage of battery consumed is so small, the relative performance differences among the architectures are very signiﬁcant.
Not included in the simulation are routing, lost packets, and higher-level protocols that add in reliability.
Thus, the simplest case is assumed to rekey the
swarm: one packet transmitted to, and received by
each swarm member containing the key. When routing and reliable protocols are factored into future
experiments, the percentage of battery consumed to
rekey will undoubtedly increase. Thus, the rate at
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Fig. 8. Average bandwidth versus swarm size (Scenario 2); (a) 25% mobile (b) 50% mobile (c) 75% mobile (d) 90% mobile.

which the percentage of battery consumed increases
with swarm size and mobility provides more useful
information. Figure 9 shows the growth rate of the
response versus swarm size and mobility is the lowest
in the Hubenko architecture.
8.3.

Overall Analysis

Several conclusions can be drawn from the simulations
conducted. Most importantly, statistical analysis of the

data conﬁrms the hypothesis. The Hubenko architecture provides statistically signiﬁcant performance gains
over commonly used baseline and cluster group communication security architectures. By taking advantage
of spatial clustering to decrease the negative performance impact of joins and departures, and integrating
GACA-GKM to decrease the negative performance
impact of highly mobile UAVs, the Hubenko architecture outperforms the baseline and cluster architectures
in all of the conducted experiments. Using the data

Fig. 9. Battery consumed versus swarm size (Scenario 2); (a) 25% mobile (b) 50% mobile (c) 75% mobile (d) 90% mobile.
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from both scenarios, the following summarizes the
performance gains achieved by the Hubenko architecture compared to the baseline architecture (ranging
from the smallest to the highest gains across all conﬁgurations):





57.8–87.6%
59.6–87.9%
73.0–87.9%
16.9–58.8%

less
less
less
less

total keys distributed
rekeys per UAV
bandwidth used to rekey
battery consumed to rekey

Similarly, the following summarizes the performance gains achieved by the Hubenko architecture
compared to the cluster architecture (ranging from the
smallest to the highest gains across all conﬁgurations):





55.2–94.9%
59.0–94.8%
55.2–85.4%
54.3–85.4%

less
less
less
less

total keys distributed
rekeys per UAV
bandwidth used to rekey
battery consumed to rekey

Also important to realize these performance gains also
coincide with an overall improvement in the security
of the system via group access controls and independent SEKs for each cluster.
Other conclusions that can be drawn from the
overall analysis of the simulations are the signiﬁcance
and effects of the factors. First, comparing data from
the two scenarios, it can be seen that the longer
simulation time, and the ability of UAVs to continuously depart and rejoin the swarm signiﬁcantly increases total keys and average rekeys. As expected,
the swarm size signiﬁcantly contributes to the variation in all of the responses, causing the most variation
in all but one of the measured responses. The architecture is the second largest contributing factor in all
but one of the responses, where it is the largest. As
discussed previously, the join rate is signiﬁcant according to the p-value from the general linear model,
but it contributes very little to the variation in the
measured responses. The mobility of the swarm has
no effect on the baseline architecture, but has signiﬁcant effects in both the Hubenko and cluster
architectures.

9.

Conclusion

The Hubenko architecture can be successfully applied
to a swarm of autonomous UAVs. Furthermore, the
Hubenko architecture signiﬁcantly outperforms the
two other security architectures studied in terms of
Published in 2008 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

reducing total keys, average rekeys, average bandwidth, and battery consumed. By taking advantage of
spatial clustering to decrease the negative performance impact of joins and departures, and integrating
GACA-GKM to decrease the negative performance
impact of highly-mobile UAVs, the Hubenko architecture is a very efﬁcient and scalable architecture
ideally suited for a swarm of UAVs.
In most cases, statistical analysis of the metrics
ﬁnds swarm size to be the largest factor contributing
to the variation in the responses, followed by the
architecture, and the swarm’s mobility. The largest
performance gains are seen in large, highly mobile
swarms, in which UAVs continuously join and depart
the group. In this type of environment the Hubenko
architecture reduces total keys, average rekeys, and
average bandwidth up to 88% compared to the baseline architecture. Battery consumed is reduced up to
59% compared to the baseline.
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